In Chapter 30, there’s a brief paragraph that mentions the tragedy of the commons. This name is fairly ominous for an economic concept, and so I did some research on it. The “tragedy of the commons” was first coined by Garrett Hardin, an evolutionary biologist. Hardin’s point was that humans who use common resources would act in their self-interest, depleting the resource in a unsustainable way, much like how herd animals would overgraze a pasture in the absence of control.
Tragedy of the commons takes a pessimistic view of humans, one that describes us as selfish beings who would take of advantage of any public goods. To some extent, Hardin is correct about this aspect of human nature, because the tragedy of the commons is visible in the real world. Examples include the Grand Banks fisheries off the coast of Newfoundland, where fishers have caught cod for centuries. In the 60s, technology increased the amount of fish that could be caught, and fishers started competing with each other to catch the most fish, which led to a severe depletion of the fisheries and the eventual collapse of the entire industry. Another example would be the Gulf of Mexico dead zone, where chemicals and nutrients from the overabundance of farms up the Mississippi River create a no life zone. The fertility of the river caused farmers to flock to it, which lead to more pollution than the river could happen, thus the dead zone.
The book discusses incentives as the main issue, as individuals aren’t incentivized to take the costs when the costs can be transferred to society. Hardin suggested government or private control of the resource. But not every river, lake, or field can be owned by the government, and certainly not privately. Also, the tragedy of the commons is quite a grim look on humanity, so is that the best we can do?
Not according to Elinor Ostrom, who was the first woman to win the Nobel Prize in economics. Ostrom showed in her research that groups will work together to manage common resources through collective property rights, as long as those using the resource of physically close to the resource geographically and have a relationship with each other. Government and private control may manage resources due to a lack of information, but groups who have a stake in the resource will come together and self-police managing the resource much collectively and more efficiently. Ostrom’s work sheds a brighter light on humanity, as it showcases the natural tendency for human cooperation. Now, her research does make it clear that her principles apply in certain conditions, such as geographical closeness. However, it shows that humans at least have the capacity to work together, meaning that it’s possible for us to reach that level of cooperation when it comes to resources that span across states, nations, and even continents. Overpopulation is a serious issue, and the resources we have are limited. We’ll need to learn how to efficiently manage those resources, and Ostrom showed that we can do it without acting in self-interest.
I think that this idea of the tragedy of the commons is really interesting, in terms of the idea that people are generally unwilling to bear the brunt of costs themselves, but will abuse resources if costs are put on society as a whole. I'm curious as to how this would apply to some of the common land or natural resources, considering it would be difficult to create collective property rights for a river or a part of an ocean. I do think that government regulation is honestly the best way to go about this particular issue just because it seems easier to associate a cost with not efficiently managing resources, even if they aren't explicitly your own.
ReplyDeleteIt is really interesting how theorists point out that incentives are the largest issue. I like how you include a different opinion by Elinor Ostrom, as she points out a possible solution in collective property rights. Overall, I think this is a really hard issue because it brings up the importance of making decisions based on a collective culture. These cultures are incredibly difficult to form because there can not be any individuals who try to self-indulge and take a higher portion than originally allocated.
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